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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
vides an example of -superimposition. There,
whenever the local coroner receives notice that
a person has died under unusual or suspicious
circumstances he is under a duty to summon
one of the medical examiners from a centralized
state crime laboratory which has proper
facilities to make adequate tests. 2 In addition
to the economic waste such a plan entails,
there is a serious question as to its legality, in
view of the various decisions which hold that
the duties of a constitutional officer as known
at common law may not be diminished by
statute. 3 However, even where constitutional
obstructions exist, introduction of the sub-
stantial benefits of a medical examiner system
is deemed so imperative that legislative modi-
fication of the coroner system is constantly
attempted in the hope of being upheld."
EXlM;ATIONS AcT § 6 (1954), alternative provision
for cooperative action by coroners with the medical
examiners where the state constitution prevents
abolishment.
4 Ga. Acts 1953, c. 21 § 2.
4 There have been few cases on this point.
People ex. rel. Walsh v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cook
County, 397 Ill. 293, 74 N.E. 2d 503 (1948) held
that a sheriff's power to select the janitorial staff
for court buildings, incidental to his common law
duty of being custodian, could not be transferred
to the county board of commissioners by statute;
Fergus v. Russel, 270 I1. 304 (1915) refused to
allow diminution of the common law duties of the
attorney general.
CONCLUSION
The traditional coroner system as it exists in
most places appears inadequate to perform the
important task assigned to it. There is nothing
to indicate that the coroner's duplication of
judicial and police investigative functions is
necessary. The medical functions all too fre-
quently have been handled in a politically
expedient manner. In most circumstances the
result has been incompetence in every phase
from initial determination of death to produc-
tion of trial evidence from the autopsy. It is
true that under the worst forms of the system a
highly competent individual may be elected
coroner and do a good job. However, only
medical examiner legislation explicitly aimed
at eradicating the evils of the coroner system
can insure permanence to high standards of
service.
44 An exafiple is illinois where bills to overhaul
the coroner system have recently been introduced
in the General Assembly. They provide all coroners
in the state with the services of medicolegal investi-
gators, and create an advisory board on state-wide
coroner practice. Coroner's inquests, however,
would be retained as mandatory in homicide and
suicide cases and optional in others. In every county
except Cook (containing Chicago) the medico-legal
investigator would be appointed by the Director of
Public Health. The coroner would appoint in
Cook County. 10 Legislative Synopsis and Digest
95 (1955).
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Propriety of Prosecuting Attorney's Argu-
ment-Defendant was convicted of a mail
fraud. On appeal he contended that the conduct
of the government attorney, in the closing
argument to the jury, was improper. The more
important instances of which complaint was
made were an appeal to the patriotism of the
jury to protect the public, references to the
purchasers as poor people and "suckers",
statements of personal belief as to the de-
fendant's guilt and incorrect statements of fact
not justified by the evidence. The court,
Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d 14 (6th
Cir. 1955), rejected these contentions saying,
"It is of course permissible for the district
attorney to ask the jury for a conviction....
In doing so the district attorney has the right
to summarize the evidence and urge upon the
jury all reasonable inferences and deductions
from the evidence. It is not misconduct on his
part to express his individual belief in the guilt
of the accused if such belief is based solely on
the evidence introduced and the jury is not led
to believe that there is other evidence, known
to the prosecutor but not introduced, justifying
that belief.... Where the nature of the
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offense charged reasonably includes a con-
sideration of the economic status of injured
persons, as in a scheme to defraud, a defendant
has no just cause to complain if that status is
disclosed.... But it must be remembered that
in the closing argument to a jury, the govern-
ment attorney is an advocate, as is counsel for
defense, and proper oratorial emphasis is
denied to neither."
The dissent argued that a district attorney,
as an important and respected official of law
and government, should not express a personal
opinion as to guilt since this "may well tip the
scales in cases where, otherwise, the jury
might conclude there was a reasonable doubt
of guilt." For a comprehensive discussion of
the whole problem of a prosecutor's summation
see comment, 42 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 73
(1951).
Forcible Taking Under Honest Claim of
Right Does Not Constitute Robbery-De-
fendant was employed at a monthly salary of
$180 with the provision that if he worked until
Fall his wages would be $200 a month. De-
fendant quit before Fall, but demanded pay at
the rate of $200, honestly believing it due.
After the employer's refusal, he drew a gun and
forced payment. The Supreme Court of
Colorado affirmed the dismissal of a charge of
aggravated robbery. People v. Gallegos, 274
P.2d 608 (Colo. 1954). The court recognized the
doctrine that where property is taken under
a bona fide claim of right the requisite intent
to support a charge of robbery is lacking. This
doctrine has generally been applied so that the
forcible taking of specific property, or money
to satisfy a liquidated debt, under a belief of
right does not constitute robbery. A majority
of courts, however, hold that such a taking to
satisfy an unliquidated claim is robbery.
Where Facts Are Rationally Established
Indictment Returned Solely on Basis of Hear-
say Testimony Will Not Be Quashed-Upon
the return of an indictment by a federal grand
jury in a tax evasion case, the accused moved to
quash on the ground that. it was based solely
on the hearsay testimony of accountants and
tax experts. judge Learned Hand wrote the
opinion in which it was held that hearsay
evidence standing alone is sufficient to support
an indictment if the facts contained therein
are rationally established by the evidence.
United States v. Costello, 23 U.S.L. Week
2532 (2d Cir. April 26, 1955). Judge Hand
noted that the general rule, that indictments
will not be dismissed solely because incompe-
tent evidence was admitted at the inquest, has
been disregarded on occasion where all the
evidence is "incompetent". See Brady v.
United States, 24 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1928). How-
ever, "if 'incompetent' is to cover all evidence,
however rationally persuasive it may be, that
would be excluded at a trial with great deference
we cannot agree.... We should be the first
to agree that, if it appeared that no evidence
has been offered that rationally established the
facts, the indictment ought to be quashed ......
Hearsay is not incompetent merely because it is
io characterized; it may be as dependable as
evidence admissible at the trial and in fact is
relied upon in everyday business. Exclusion of
hearsay is a privilege accorded an accused and
a failure to invoke this privilege will result in its
acceptance by the court. The primary ob-
jection to the admissibility of hearsay is that it
denies the accused the right of cross-exami-
nation. This right is absent anyway at a uni-
lateral investigation like an inquest in that the
accused is normally not present so that objec-
tion does not here prevail.
Felony-Murder Rule Applied Where Ar-
sonist's Accomplice Died of Accidental Burns
Suffered While Arson Was Being Committed-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied
the felony-murder rule in a case where an
accomplice of the accused died from burns
accidently received while committing the
arson. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 23 U.S.L.
Week 2532 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1955) (conviction
reversed on other grounds). Applying the
common-law rule that a person in the act of
committing a felony has the requisite legal
malice to sustain a finding of guilty of first-
degree murder, the court reviewed what it felt
to be a number of analogous cases in which
felons had been found guilty of murder in the
first degree. The common denominator in
these cases was that a person who participates
1955]
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in certain types of felonies is guilty for all the
acts of his confederates in furtherance of a
common design. The court observed that
an arsonist "is bound to know the perils and
natural results" of his act and summarized its
holding as follows: "If a person with legal
malice commits an act or sets off a chain of
events from vhich, in the common experience
of mankind, the death of another is a natural
and foreseeable result, that person is guilty of
murder, if death results from that act or from
the events which it naturally produced. If the
original malicious act was arson, rape, robbery,
burglary or kidnapping, the original actor is
guilty of murder in the first degree."
The question of whether an intervening or
supervening act is sufficient to interrupt the
normal chain of events is a matter of law for
the court and its occurrence or non-occurrence
a matter of fact for the jury. Here the court
found as a matter of law that no intervening
act had occurred.
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